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On Jewish Being 
Notes on Jean Améry 
Andrew Benjamin 
Monash University 
Le juif du Livre n’est pas fidèle, mais l’infidèle, l’insurgé, 
l’exilé: Celui pour qui le livre est chaque fois autre au 
risqué de n’etre plus.1 
 – Edmond Jabès 
1 
That the question of identity takes on a sense of urgency, one with its own 
possibilities and impossibilities, the moment that identity is bound up with 
death, is hardy surprising.2 What follows are a series of reflections on the 
question of identity, Jewish identity, raised by Jean Améry’s remarkable text 
On the Necessity and Impossibility of Being a Jew (Über Zwang und 
Unmöglichkeit, Jude zu sein). 3 Améry’s text was of course published in the 
wake of his own experiences as an active member of the resistance, as 
having been imprisoned in Auschwitz and as the victim of torture. 
Philosophically, rather than biographically, if there were a point of 
comparison, then it is to Levinas’s 1947 text Etre juif.4 Both pose the problem 
of how the question of Jewish identity, Jewish being, is to be understood in 
the wake of the Shoah. The meaning of the formulations - Jude zu sein, Jude 
sein, Etre juif, Jewish being – delimits the question to be addressed.5 This will 
be the case even if its point of address, namely what the question stages, is 
itself far from straightforward. Moreover, while what is demanded within 
that question is itself philosophically important, it is equally the case that the 
question of Jewish being is at work within both communities and synagogues 
across the Jewish world. As a consequence it is as much a philosophical 
question as it is one that has a structuring effect on how Jewish survival is 
conceived (and thus equally on what that survival is taken to be). How 
survival is understood is an issue that continues to exert its force. Who is the 
subject of survival? What is the subject of survival? Who or what has been 
subjected to the issue of survival? Survival is both more nuanced and 
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complex than the brute fact of an afterlife. Jewish being as a present question 
– a question of the present - continues therefore.6  
Nothing can diminish the horrors through which Améry lived. Not 
only were the marks of humanity taken from those who endured it, 
language was also debilitated. Worlds were altered. Time itself came to be 
recast as a result.7 The experience of time stripped of the feint of the natural 
had to reemerge as a site of genuine engagement (though equally of an 
always possible sustained failure to engage).8 Memory as an act, and 
memorialization as a set of practices which move between the liturgical and 
the architectural, are sustained as legacies without any one determined form 
being able to predominate.9 As has been suggested what continuity means is 
a question for which answers that summarize and complete are no longer at 
hand. To compare genocides is to trivialize them. Each one is beyond 
comparison precisely because each has a singularity that has to be 
maintained. Questions of guilt, victimhood and forgiveness differ.10 That 
with which differing forms of reconciliation takes place become banal once 
they are generalized.  
The Nazis had a number of victims. Overwhelmingly, however, they 
were Jews. Of concern here, in this encounter with Améry, is the assault that 
took place on the Jews. Who were these Jews? The Nazi’s Jews were 
assaulted, though they were assaulted after having been constructed to be 
assaulted. The act of construction allows for the moment of 
individualization, that is, identifying the Jews as no longer part of the 
common. Thus they no longer occupy a place within the world, hence the 
world is recreated in order to be Judenfrei. Once recreated it then becomes 
the place occasioning literal violence.11 Individuation, within this set up, a 
process which can equally be understood as a form of violence, occurs in 
order that those individuated can then become the be subjected to what 
would now be sanctioned literal violence. The contention here therefore is 
that this construction has a twofold effect. In the first instance it created Jews 
from within a setting that gave rise as much to forms of non-identification, 
as it did to forms of identification. And in the second, it created Jews in a 
way that undid dignity. At work were processes leading to the creation of a 
way of being that can be reformulated as being-without-dignity. A position 
that was produced and which would have marked in advance those that had 
been so produced. The question of Jewish being was resolved in one direction 
by National Socialism. It took place as a result of the laws enacted in its 
name, the imprisoning, torture and death that then ensued, sustained 
throughout by the creation and recreation of those defined as being-without-
dignity. An important qualification needs to be introduced here. This 
creation is the reduction of those individuated to what Walter Benjamin 
would have identified as “mere life.”12 It is a process. Hence, pace Agamben, 
neither being nor life could have been “bare” for the exact reason that 
existence would always have borne the mark of this form of production.13 
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The tattoo is the refusal of bareness. Partly as a result of processes of subject 
creation, individuation, within this setting definition and self-definition did 
not always coincide. This is the predicament. Note the way Améry begins 
his account: 
If today discomfort arises in me when a Jew takes it for granted, 
legitimately, that I am part of his community, then it is not because 
I don’t want to be a Jew, but only because I cannot be one. And yet 
must be one. (nur weil ich es nicht sein kann. Und es doch sein muß.)14 
The müssen (the “must”) in the und es doch sein muß has a twofold effect. 
It brings into play both a duty and an obligation. The sense of obligation 
is complex. It allows for set up in which the subject in question is 
positioned as having been obligated by a form of externality; thus the 
subject is obligated from the outside.  
At the outset what is at work within this formulation is a specific 
address to the question of Jewish being. Specificity occurs in the precise sense 
that it is posed in terms of being (sein) and not being (nicht sein). Enacted here 
therefore is a complex set of connections between self-identification and 
having been identified.15 As result, reference is already made to the Jews’ 
own relation to community and thus to the place of that community, as well 
as any wider sense of the common that may prevail. (And thus the place of 
the apparently singular within the created common.) The latter, the 
singular’s relation to the common, can be understood as a version of the 
“Jewish question.”16 Though what is also clear is the way that this complex 
structure of identity is set in place has to have had a determining effect on 
the way this “question” is posed. Within the structure created by this 
“question” one domain is of necessity refracted through the other. There can 
be no simple separation. And this is the case even if such a separation were 
thought to be possible. The “Jewish question” will always have been 
informed by differing ways in which the constitution of identity occurs.17 
Here that constitution can be thought, following the direction of Améry’s 
own argumentation, in terms of the continual creation of a being-without-
dignity. 
If there is a difficulty with Améry’s work, then it is not with either the 
strength or perceived weakness in any of his modes or forms of 
argumentation. The difficulty inheres in the demands made by his writings. 
These writings are at once reflective and autobiographical, at once 
descriptive and confessional. Within them there is a stark openness. To read 
them is to have to read without their hold having been loosened; flinching 
without flinching.  There is no way out. And yet, responding to his work 
cannot adopt the same tone. There would be a form of injustice within such 
an act. Améry is acutely aware of the singularity of his own experience. The 
truth that results from that singularity is clear; namely, that one set of 
experiences cannot be countered by another. To respond to the evocation of 
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the body with another such evocation is to have missed what is at stake. 
Améry writes “I.” He writes the history of an “I,” that to which that “I” was 
subject and thus, more emphatically, of the constitution of that “I” as a being-
without-dignity. To reiterate the point that has already been suggested, this 
act of constitution, precisely because what it constitutes is a being-without-
dignity, and thus in Améry’s terms as “someone to be murdered” (ein zu 
Ermordender), is an act of violence; an act of violence enjoining violence. 18  (It 
will be essential to return to this point.) The singularity of his predicament, 
the predicament of his body, gives rise to the question: By what right could 
“I” – an “I” and thus another “I”- be written in response? If it were more 
than the countering of one experience with another, then this “I” would be a 
naturalization of the “I” thereby giving rise to a merely putative 
universality. As a result Améry’s entire project would then have been 
betrayed. Naturalism would become a form of philosophical failure. 
Performed failure. A failure to have understood that what Améry writes is 
located within a setting of contested affirmation. Rebellion is already the 
undoing of an enforced nature though not in the name of a prior nature 
(which would be no more than a merely suggested and therefore ultimately 
illusory “real” nature).  
 
2 
Améry recounts an experience. He cannot respond, as does a fellow 
concertgoer, another Jew, to the singing of the words Sch’ma Israel in a 
performance of Arnold Schonberg’s A Survivor From Warsaw. Hearing, but 
not having been touched, touched in the sense of having been able to 
respond emotionally, occurs within a setting that is marked by both a 
distancing and more significantly by a sense of identity that links a feeling of 
belonging to a prevailing “catastrophe.” Améry writes: 
To be a Jew (Jude sein), I cannot do it emotionally, (ich kann es nicht 
in Ergriffenheit) I thought to myself afterwards, is not possible for 
me, I can be a Jew only in fear and anger, when in order to attain 
dignity, fear transforms itself into anger. "Hear, oh Israel" is not my 
concern (geht mich nichts an). Only a "hear, oh world" (Höre Welt) 
wants angrily to break out from within me. The six-digit number 
on my forearm demands it. That is what the awareness of 
catastrophe, the dominant force of my existence (meiner Existenz), 
requires.19 
There is a divide, a breach. Hear, oh Israel are words that do not touch. He 
remains unmoved. He could not have been clearer. What they evoke, he 
writes,  “is not my concern” (geht mich nichts an). (This is the “impossibility” 
of being a Jew that is announced in the text’s title.) There is another set of 
words, a different formulation that he would seek to deploy. They are words 
that announce a type of a move. A move that both reinforces the injustice of 
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any response that begins “I” and, at the same time, names that which 
endures as essential if the predicament presented by Améry is to become a 
genuine site of engagement. The other demand, one that arises, is to voice 
that which is unvoiced namely, to reiterate his formulation, "hear, oh world" 
(Höre Welt). (This is the “impossibility” of not being a Jew that the title also 
announces.)  
The world is there. Nonetheless questions abound.  How is this 
evocation of the “world” to be understood? What is there in this voicing to 
the world that would also be a voicing of the world? What would it mean to 
speak to the world, while also speaking of the world? Again a doubling 
insists. While this passage cited above needs to be incorporated into the text 
as a whole, what has to be retained is the centrality of what is named here as 
the “world.” There are two elements that are important. In the first instance 
there is the introduction of the “world” and thus what can be thought as the 
complex problem of the relation between an enforced particularism, this is 
the particularism that seeks the world as the result of an insistent non-
identification with the Shema, and the world as that which stands opposed to 
this particularism (and its being this particularism, the particularity of Jewish 
being, is an essential component of what is at stake here). In the second there 
is the more general question of place. What is evoked, what is called into 
consideration within the formulation, “hear oh world,” is the world as place 
and the place of the Jews within it, though equally a place within that world 
for the Jews. And while what continues is the problem of how the identity 
staged by Jewish being is to be understood, what the formulation “hear, oh 
world” (Höre Welt) brings to the fore is the recognition that being is worldly, 
and thus it is always placed. The place of the world must be central. A 
return will need to be made to the “world” since it will be in terms of the 
world that the interplay between violence and identity is best approached. 
As will be noted violence, when understood as a philosophical term, is 
integral to any account of the creation of identities such a being-without-
dignity and thus their worlds. Violence is not just an individual act. It is 
worldly in part because while sanctioned by the world that world is 
configured to deny its victim a place within it. Taken together this is the 
event of violence.  
 
3 
As has already been intimated, one of the key terms at work in “On the 
Necessity and Impossibility of Being a Jew” is “dignity” (Würde). The term is 
central to the development of the philosophical after the Shoah and indeed 
to deploy Arendt's terminology after the “totalitarian.” Her general claim 
that in the wake of the totalitarian dignity needs a “new guarantee” remains 
a powerful argument.20 Indeed, these reflections on Améry can be situated 
within that wider project. The term “dignity” continues to appear in this 
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particular text. It appears, moreover, within Améry’s larger set of writings. 
Dignity returns. He asks the question: “What is dignity?” The question 
endures. At times answers are suggested. They are linked to the erotic, to 
free speech, to a sense of “physical convenience.”21 While there are allusions 
within these tentative identifications, dignity fails to be captured by these 
possibilities. They allude to it but do not address it directly. What then 
would be the address of dignity? To take another stand, another way 
through, and thus to engage the question differently would be to argue that 
dignity is linked to a type of freedom and therefore it amounted to the 
ability to choose within a situation. Dignity would then be bound to the 
freedom to act. However, this is a sense of freedom that alludes to what 
might be called empty intrinsic qualities. While Améry may resist such a 
formulation it is already there in his attempt to counter the negative with the 
positive. He writes: 
If I were correct that the deprivation of dignity (der Würdeentzug) 
were nothing other than the potential deprivation of life 
(Lebensentzug), then dignity would have to be the right to live.22  
What is problematic, for Améry, within this formulation is the sense of 
abstraction. The position is inadequate. The inadequacy for Améry is clear.  
A recourse to abstraction is not the counter to dignity’s deprivation. What 
stands opposed to abstract right, namely the threat of death, would render 
that right inoperable and hence claims to dignity, equally claims to regain 
lost dignity, based merely on such a right would have been of no value. 
Abstraction endures therefore as problem. Hence the force of Arendt’s claim 
that “the world found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of being 
human.”23 The limit of this particular construal of abstraction demands 
another way through. However, if there were another way of working 
through this predicament, and here what matters is Améry’s own position, 
then it hinges on how the interplay of the operable and the inoperable is to 
be understood:  
It is certainly true that dignity can be bestowed only by society, 
whether it be the dignity of some office, a professional or, very 
generally speaking, civil dignity, and the merely individual, 
subjective claim ("I am a human being and as such I have my 
dignity, no matter what you may do or say!") is an empty academic 
game, or madness. Still, the degraded person (der entwürdigte), 
threatened with death, is able - and here we break through the logic 
of the final sentencing - to convince society of his dignity (seine 
Würde) by taking his fate (sein Schicksal) upon himself and at the 
same time (zugleich) rising in revolt against it.24  
Note the double move that occurs at the end of this formulation. Améry is 
quick to recognize that there is a version of dignity that depends upon its 
being conferred. And yet, the mere self-assertion of dignity is empty. The 
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fundamental point in the way the position is constructed involves the threat 
of death, and thus the threat of non-being, as the point of departure. And 
there is, of course, a real correlation between the act of constitution in which 
being-without-dignity is created and a subsequent death.  Being-without-dignity 
leads to death as the resultant non-being. One allows and thus occasions the 
other. One is marked and re-marked by the other.) Given that insistent 
possibility, i.e. the move from being-without identity to non-being - the latter is 
the realization of the threat that the former brings with it - what then obtains 
is the need for that affirmation of a form of existence that circumvents this 
setting and the movement within it. This would be the setting in which life 
would counter death in the precise sense that the link between being-without 
identity to non-being would be broken because the possibility of dignity 
would have been retrieved. As such, in the place of abstraction, it would be 
life that counters death.  
For Améry this becomes the affirmation of identity through an act of 
revolt. His formulation is precise. Dignity emerges in taking over the 
question of “fate” (Schicksal) as one’s own and thus to resist the enforcing of 
fate, the state of having been fated. However this is not a single act with a 
single object. Its formulation involves a doubled presence. There is an 
insistent zugleich – “at the same time” – that determines this doubling. The 
taking over of fate and the “rising in revolt” while separate occur together. 
There is therefore what might be described as an anoriginal at-the-same-
timeness; i.e. an-original doubling at the origin. Dignity cannot be thought as 
a mere intrinsic quality. On the contrary, while intrinsic it has to be acted 
out. An insistence on the actative obviates the hold of an empty abstraction. 
It is essential to be clear. Dignity is an intrinsic quality in the precise sense 
that dignity is what it is in its being lived out, though equally in the refusal 
to let that be the case. The denial of dignity is always an attendant 
possibility. There is an inherent fragility within the intrinsic. Potentialities 
need not be actualized.25 
While not argued for in these precise terms by Améry, what this 
formulation entails is that dignity is a potentiality awaiting actualization, 
though equally awaiting the refusal of its actualization. If refused, and this is 
Améry’s position, it has to be affirmed by revolting against that which 
would refuse it. (Recognizing that refusal is a form of action.) In other 
words, dignity is not just given within an affirmative act, it is also what 
allows the affirmation to have become a form of sovereignty. In sum, revolt 
occurs “at the same time” (zugleich) as the seizing of fate. The later is itself a 
double movement comprised of a seizing for oneself that is also a seizing 
away. Doing, and an enacted undoing, one and the other, define action in 
this particular context. Revolt as affirmation is therefore creative because in 
seeking to undo the violence inherent in the constitution of being-without-
dignity it opens up the register of dignity as that which continues to find 
form. In this context, as noted above, dignity, thus the living out of dignity’s 
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affirmation, needs to be thought in terms of a potentiality coming to be 
actualized. Occurring as a result is, of course, the enacting of another mode 
of being.  Though as always a type of caution is necessary. Openings that 
occur are tenuous. Guarantees are necessarily limited. Even within 
barbarism acting as resisting, resisting and revolt as delimiting modes of 
possible action, remain. 
 
4 
What has to be pursued is this set of doublings: i.e. doing and undoing, 
seizing for oneself and a seizing away. They provide a way of allowing for 
the body as a locus of affect, and yet at the same time allowing for the 
recognition of dignity that brings another body to the fore. The 
naturalization of the body would empty Améry’s concerns of their insistent 
quality. The move from being-without-dignity to another body is not the 
return to an original body. Torture as unnatural needs another counter, a 
different counter measure.26 The body demands another possibility. In fact, it 
demands life as the affirmation beyond the continual threat of non-being, 
which can be also thought as the result of having been rendered inoperable. 
While inoperability is always produced, hence the link between 
inoperability and non-being, operability understood as action, as inherently 
workful, positions life as the counter to having been produced for death. 
While it cannot be pursued here it is possible to note that within the horrors 
on which Améry is dwelling there is both another thinking of death, as well 
as the life/death relation. Not only does death lose its essential and abstract 
quality – the distinction between having been produced for non-being and 
mere death will always obtain if only as a threat that continues – it is equally 
the case that what is maintained as essential is a potentiality for revolt that 
can always be translated as the potentiality to resist fate in the name of life. 
Life, understood as a demand, can be taken up by pursuing some of 
the implications within one of the ways the body figures within Améry’s 
text: 
My body, debilitated and crusted with filth, was my calamity. My 
body, when it tensed to strike, was my physical-metaphysical 
dignity (meine physisch-metaphysische Würde). In situations like mine, 
physical violence is the sole means for restoring a disjointed 
personality. In the punch, I was myself (Ich war ich als ein Schlag) - 
for myself and for my opponent. What I later read in Frantz 
Fanon’s Les damnés de la terre, in a theoretical analysis of the 
behaviour of colonized peoples, I anticipated back then when I 
gave concrete social form to my dignity by punching a human face. 
To be a Jew meant the acceptance of the death sentence imposed by 
the world as a world verdict (Jude sein, das war Annahme der 
Todesurteil durch die Welt als eben eines Welturteil). To flee before it by 
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withdrawing into one’s self would have been nothing but a 
disgrace, whereas acceptance was simultaneously the physical 
revolt against it. I became a person not by subjectively appealing to 
my abstract humanity but by discovering myself within the given 
social reality (der gegebenen gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit) as a 
rebelling Jew and by realizing myself as one.27 
What is at work within the passage? As a beginning there is the body as the 
locus of affect. The affected body is the site on which the torturer would 
have worked. This is the body of a being-without-dignity. Hence, this is the 
site that has become degraded (and is being degraded by the continuity of 
indignity, by the reiteration of its enacted presence). Again, it is essential to 
note that indignity – the body as being-without-dignity - is produced as such. 
Améry is careful to write of degradation, or processes of degradation which 
are, of course, the continual recreation of indignity: the latter is 
Entwürdigungsprozeß. Thus, this is the undoing of dignity and the 
corresponding constitution of being-without-dignity. Precisely because it will 
have been constituted as such, this accounts for the force that continues to 
inhere in the word “dignity” (Würde).  
Améry’s body was “debilitated and crusted with filth.” No matter 
how stark a description this is, starker because of its truth, that body 
provides another possibility. Within its “debilitated” state there was another 
quality. This showed itself when his body “was tensed to strike.” Tensed, 
having the potential to act, being present on the verge of release, taken 
together they allowed the body, at that moment, to be a locus of his 
“physical-metaphysical dignity .” The “strike,” that act, unifies a self that 
has been taken apart. Within it, almost inhabiting the “strike,” Améry 
becomes who he is.  Operability as a mode of sovereignty begins to take 
over. Acting yields a self that came to exist both for himself, that is for 
Améry, and also for the other. This other is, of course, not an anonymous 
abstract other. The one he faces, the faced other, is his “opponent” (Gegner). 
The dissymmetry here was neither merely structural nor was it benign. The 
relation in this instance is comprised of a constituted disequilibrium of 
power forcing and reinforcing violence. Within that setting dignity emerges 
in the blow that was delivered. Its sense – understood as comprising, 
direction, meaning and presence as a feeling – depended on its occurring 
within a setting created by the constitution of a being-without-dignity. The 
question to be addressed is why does dignity emerge here? What is the link 
between dignity and the “punch” (Faustschlag)?  
The answer begins to emerge in the next line of the passage under 
consideration. Hence, it is vital here to repeat the line in which it is staged. 
Améry wrote:  
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To be a Jew (Jude sein) meant the acceptance of the death sentence 
imposed by the world as a world verdict (das war Annahme der 
Todesurteil durch die Welt als eben eines Welturteil).28   
Death here is nothing other than a “judgment” (urteil) imposed by the world 
as the world’s own judgement. In other words, it was the world that 
condemned Jews to death. The “world” constructs them as such. They 
become inoperable, stripped of sovereignty. The “opponent” therefore is 
both the guard, thus what amounts to the concrete other, whilst this other is 
also the one who in acting is imposing upon Améry’s body the verdict of the 
world. It is always both. It is never just one. Hence, the other’s body is not 
just one. Nor is the body just the body. The face of the guard and the face of 
the world are there at the same time. This is a counter presence; thus another 
form of at-the-same-timeness. What might be understood as its other face. In 
other words, what is struck, what the fist hits is that which is both the 
other’s face, the clear enforcing face of brutality and yet that face is, at the 
same time, the face of the world. It is the latter because the “judgement of 
death” (der Todesurteil) is “a judgement of the world” (eines Welturteil.). 
Améry faced both. What then is the response? And it should be remembered 
that it is a response to processes that create indignity (Entwürdigungsprozeß) 
and thus it is not just a response to the face of the guard. Améry’s body 
opposed more; and was itself always opposed by more. This “more” is 
however not an addition. It is an always already present “more” that 
structures the locus of judgment while creating the conditions for a 
response. 
What is dismissed by Améry as a possible response to this 
predicament is that form of flight that separated the individual from the 
world and thus from the world’s judgement. The latter had to be meet head 
on in a meeting that can be characterised as both worldly and world 
creating. Standing opposed to the world as the locus of “death sentence” is 
the world given within and as an affirmative act. The opposite is a type of 
“disgrace”: this would be Schmach either as apatheia or the expressed 
preference not to act. Here the Jew as a being-without-dignity for whom the 
slip into non-being attends every moment is confronted by a radically 
divergent set of possibilities. Within them acting and not acting have a 
different set of entailments.  
Stand taking as opposed to “flight,” world creating as opposed to 
accepting the world’s judgment, are modes of affirmation through which 
there would be a becoming human. A becoming in which what was attained 
was dignity, thus there would be an emergent operability. One would work 
with the other. This did not occur through a process in which the abstract 
human was evoked such that as a result an abstract form of particularity 
would then arise. Nor was it the affirmation of mere particularity. The 
contrary is the case. A specific stand was taken within a specific context. The 
latter, the context in question and the one in which the stand occurred, was 
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described by Améry as “the given social reality” (der gegebenen 
gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit). What this means is that the identity that comes 
to be affirmed, and this affirmation is equally the affirmation of a form of 
dignity, takes place within that setting – the world – whose project was the 
creation of a subject without dignity, i.e. the continual recreation of a being-
without-dignity. This occurs precisely because the act that affirmed identity 
could not have been enacted by an abstract human since the creation of a 
subject without dignity could not have pertained to an abstract human but 
only to identities that have been created.  In the context of Améry’s concerns 
this means the creation of the Jew as inseparable from the creation of what 
has already been described as being-without-dignity and therefore, as has 
already been noted, as “someone to be murdered” (ein zu Ermordender).  
Abstraction, in this instance, could not be affirmed, against a process 
that produced the Jew as a being-without-dignity for the exact reason that 
these processes did not start with abstraction. On the contrary, and to stay 
close to Améry’s own examples and thus argumentation, a start was made 
by the Nürnberger Gesetze which were passed in Reichstag in September 1935 
which both undid identities, the identity between a Jew and German citizen, 
while simultaneously constructing identities. For any one constructed as a 
Jew from within this setting, and this act of construction was independent of 
any form of self-identification, while there was always a range of possible 
responses, for Améry the only possible response was one that gave action a 
particular quality. Action was not a mere occurrence. On the contrary action 
would be defined as the affirmation of a link between identity, dignity and 
world creation. This connection, and its doubled presence both play a 
fundamental role here. The connection comprises the movement that is 
already there in the countervailing sense of at-the-same-timeness. Here what 
that means is acting, in Améry’s words, “as a rebelling Jew.” One mode 
taken by this rebellion became the literal blow (Schlag) against the processes 
in which dignity was effaced or denied.29  
 
5 
The opening beyond any reduction to the literal necessitates giving more 
attention to how the process of revolt can be understood as an actual counter 
measure, and thus how it brings with it a mode of philosophical thought 
whose concern is the world’s transformation. (The latter – world 
transformation - has already been alluded to when reference was made to 
world creating, which is of course the countering of one world with 
another.) This is the possibility that inheres in the evocation, “Hear oh 
World”; the singular appeal to the world. The world thus appears within 
one of the senses of at-the-same-timeness that has already been noted. Jewish 
being as constituted in terms of being-without-dignity was defined by the 
imposition of a death sentence. It was imposed by the world. It was, to 
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maintain Améry’s formulation, a judgement made by the world. While it 
was the world that constructed the Jew as a being-without-dignity and 
therefore as “someone to be murdered,” that world appeared, at the same 
time, in the face of the guard. To strike against the guard was to strike 
against that world. Hence the guard cannot be reduced to a single entity. 
There was an original relation between the guard and the world. One was an 
after-effect of the other. What this means is that the guard/world relation 
was itself also a founding relation that pertained within the setting of at-the-
same-timeness. To strike the face of the guard was an act of rebellion precisely 
because it was not just the guard’s face that was struck. It was this sense of 
at-the-same-timeness that provides the link to the other sense. It is this latter 
possibility that is locus of rebellion. What this sets in play is the possibility 
that the strike, the blow that lands on the face of the guard, is equally a 
strike against a world. The strike would then have opened a world, perhaps 
more exactly would have begun to open a world, the blow would have 
begun to be world creating. The blow therefore is an-arché in the precise 
sense that it provides an arché that has an indeterminate relation to any 
outcome. The blow is productive – potentiality – without having an already 
determined formal end. The world sustaining being-without-dignity would be 
displaced by the possibility of dignity’s own self-affirmation. Dignity would 
have begun to recover its place in the world. All this occurs through action. 
What still needs to be incorporated into this account of world creating is the 
other modality of at-the-same-timeness. 
The other modality was linked to the presence of fate. To affirm 
dignity meant to wrest fate from the identity (i.e. the identity determined in 
advance, fated identity) that had been constructed for the Jew, and thus 
wresting it from the process in which the Jew was constructed. It was this 
fated identity that became the site of struggle. What was taken on within 
that site is what can now be understood as the judgment imposed by the 
“world.” The judgment constructed a subject; the subject in question, the one 
constructed, is “the degraded person (der entwürdigte), the subject as being-
without-identity. This is the subject who acts. In acting as the one deemed to 
be without dignity, dignity comes to be affirmed. (Thus it should be 
remembered that to be without dignity means having been constituted as 
such.) That affirmation is the actualization of an inherent potentiality to-be-
dignified (a state of affairs that would amount to the affirmation of an 
original setting, an already present sense of operability as potentiality) 
which is both fragile and precarious. Affirming and attaining have an 
essential reciprocity. Inherent to dignity is its actualization. This is the site in 
which violence figures. 
Violence as has been suggested individualizes insofar as it creates 
subjects, creates then by producing them as inoperable. Its object is a group, 
a race, a community or even an individual.  They are constructed, created, 
such that they can be subject to literal violence. Hence death or torture 
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follows. Améry’s writings are positioned by that nexus. If there is a way 
through, then it can be located in the recognition that violence works 
through modes of construction. The pain of literal violence has to be 
understood in relation to the construction of the one on whom violence is 
perpetrated as the victim. There are different ways of understanding 
Améry’s claim that torture “was not an accidental quality of this Third 
Reich, rather its essence” (sondern seiner Essenz).30 The way for it to be 
understood that is implicit in what has been suggested thus far is that it 
becomes the next move once a being-without-dignity has been created. This 
form of individuation allows for literal violence. That is why these specific 
processes of individuation can be described as violent. Indeed, it is possible 
to go further and suggest that literal violence is only possible if it is 
continuous with this mode of individuation. Rebellion is the refusal of 
having been constructed such that literal violence is simply continuous with 
the constructed state.   The asserting of dignity becomes the attempt to undo 
this particular sense of continuity. Dignity is recovered to the extent that the 
discontinuity, the necessary discontinuity thus the one continually 
displacing any continuity, between modes of being and literal violence can 
be affirmed. That discontinuity, while precarious and thus enjoining a 
necessary vigilance, becomes the space whose maintenance allows human 
being in its diversity to appear. It becomes the space allowing for Jewish 
being.  
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